What encourages (and what deters) people from reporting corruption? A comparison between Spain and Italy
16 July 2026
María Cristina Fernández-González, from the European University of Valencia and an EWI Fellow, discusses the factors that shape the decision to report corruption, drawing on her recent academic work “Comparative Analysis of the Incentives and Disincentives to Report Corruption: A Comparison Between the Spanish and Italian Cases”, published in Comparative Social Research (vol. 38).
My research starts with a question that criminology has been trying to answer for years: if reporting corruption benefits society as a whole, why do so many people who witness wrongdoing choose to remain silent? The answer, as the literature shows, rarely lies in the individual. It lies in the many and difficult circumstances: fear of retaliation, the absence of safe reporting channels, and distrust of institutions carry far more weight than the personality or values of the person who witnesses the offense.
To explore this question, I compared the legal frameworks of Spain and Italy since both countries have a similar legal system, a shared history of political corruption linked to organized crime, and very different trajectories in transposing Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of whistleblowers.
Original data: Interviews with 15 whistleblowers
I conducted a comprehensive literature review of the motivations for and resistances to reporting, combined with the compilation of data from Spain's regional authorities and a comparative analysis of both countries' legislation. The research was carried out within the framework of an agreement between the University of Salamanca and the Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency, and included protected interviews, conducted under a confidentiality agreement, with 15 corruption whistleblowers from the Valencian Community.
“Contextual variables – the threat of retaliation, the availability of anonymous channels, the organizational climate – influence the decision to report more strongly than the whistleblower's individual characteristics.”
Literature points to four particularly significant deterrents: the high likelihood of retaliation (ranging from workplace harassment, or mobbing, to dismissal), the absence of anonymous reporting channels, the lack of external and independent authorities, and the risk of incurring criminal liability when obtaining or disclosing the information. Working in the opposite direction, personal ethical commitment, compliance programs that clarify what to report and how, and – in some legal systems, though not the European ones – financial or social rewards all act as incentives.
Italy & Spain transposition of EU Whistleblower Directive
The comparison shows that Italy got there first. Since 2012 it has had the Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione (ANAC), consolidated over more than a decade as an external reporting channel, equipped with sanctioning powers and an appointment procedure that requires the approval of the relevant parliamentary committees. Spain, by contrast, transposed the Directive late, through Law 2/2023, and the Independent Whistleblower Protection Authority (AAI) created by that law is still not operational: its presidency is proposed through the Ministry of Justice, which undermines the very independence its name proclaims.
This disparity comes with an important nuance. While the national level in Spain lagged behind, the autonomous regions moved ahead: Catalonia from 2008, and the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Community from 2016, created pioneering anti-fraud offices. The Valencian Anti-Fraud Agency earned recognition at the European level for its work protecting whistleblowers and even came to share its technological platform (Globaleaks) with the Italian authority. Yet the lack of material independence of these regional bodies has already led to the abolition of the Balearic Office, and the Valencian agency appears to be heading down the same path.
“Anti-corruption agencies that lack impartiality, or appear dependent on the government, are unlikely to become whistleblowers' preferred reporting channel – and that in itself discourages reporting.”
Anonymous reporting
On anonymity, Spain now offers a clearer framework: Law 2/2023 expressly allows anonymous reports both through internal channels and through the AAI's external channel, with the backing of the Supreme Court. Italy protects confidentiality but leaves anonymous reports in a grey zone of discretion. Both countries, however, share two significant gaps: neither protects whistleblowers who committed an unlawful act to access the reported information – a legal vacuum in the Spanish case (Article 38 of Law 2/2023) and an express exclusion in the Italian one – and neither provides financial or social rewards, or psychological and financial support measures, despite the Directive recommending them.
Trust is the key factor
Legal protection against retaliation is necessary, but it is not enough. The decision to report depends above all on trust: trust that the channel works, that the authority is genuinely independent, and that blowing the whistle will not destroy the whistleblower's personal, financial, and psychological life. Italy shows that building this trust takes years of consistent institutional performance; Spain shows that territorial fragmentation and the politicization of appointments can erode it before the system even gets started.
Beyond prohibiting reprisals, then, we need to strengthen comprehensive support mechanisms such as psychological assistance, financial protection, stronger institutional safeguards, and consider publicly recognizing those who report, as organizations such as Transparency International and Hay Derecho already do. Only then can the figure of the “snitch” be reframed as what it truly is: a whistleblower fulfilling, with society's backing, a professional and civic duty.
